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Abstract   This chapter asks if and why advanced countries differ in their ability to export 
to China and India. To this end we exploit a newly collected, comparable cross-country da-
taset (EFIGE) obtained from a survey of 15,000 manufacturing firms in Austria, France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. The EFIGE dataset contains de-
tailed information on firms’ international activities as well as firms’ characteristics like size 
and productivity, governance and management structure, workforce, innovation and re-
search activity. We study both the extensive and intensive margins of exports and identify 
the firm characteristics that are positively or negatively correlated with exporting activity 
tout court and with exporting to China and India conditional on being an exporter. We con-
firm previous rich evidence and show that larger, more productive, and more innovative 
firms are more likely to become exporters and export more. We also provide some new ev-
idence on the role of governance and management: while there does not seem to be a strong 
negative effect of family ownership, we find that a higher percentage of family manage-
ment reduces a firm’s export propensity and export volumes. When we turn to exports to 
China and India, we find that firms exporting there must be on average larger, more produc-
tive and innovative than firms exporting elsewhere.  
1. Introduction 
 
In advanced countries, the economic and political debate on the impact of glob-
alization is dominated by the negative effects, mostly in terms of employment, 
coming from the rapid rise of emerging economies, like China and India, as fierce 
competitors on world markets of goods and services. The other side of the coin 
has so far received less attention: China and India are also exceptionally large and 
very dynamic destination markets that benefit advanced countries’ exports and 
growth. 
In the last two decades the weight of China in the globalised world has remark-
ably risen and China has become one of the most important players in internation-
al trade. This process of integration has accelerated with its entry into the WTO in 
2001. WTO membership has implied the lowering of import tariffs and the author-
isation for foreign firms to sell directly in the Chinese market. These policy 
measures have further opened the door to foreign firms. China is not only a sup-
plier of low-cost inputs for developed countries but has become an expanding 
market, offering profitable business opportunities.   
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Exports to China have been growing for all developed countries. Because of 
proximity, this rise has been especially fast in Japan and other industrialised Asian 
economies. Trends are on the rise in all countries, although some, and especially 
Germany, have been especially successful in strengthening their position in Asian 
markets. Others are lagging behind. China’s share in total Italian exports is lower 
than for the EU15 average. In this chapter we study the causes of these differ-
ences, using the new EFIGE data set, which includes information on firms’ inter-
national activities for 7 European economies (Austria, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Hungary, Italy and Spain, see Barba Navaretti et al., 2011). 
It is of course a well known fact that the distributions of firms’ characteristics 
are extremely heterogeneous within countries and industries. Also a large body of 
theoretical and empirical literature (Helpman et al., 2004, Eaton et al., 2004) has 
highlighted how these characteristics are likely to affect export performance.  
The key discriminatory features are size and productivity, given the high fixed 
costs of carrying out international activities. The first step of our analysis, there-
fore, is understanding how far the distribution of these features of European firms 
affect i) the extensive and intensive margins of exports and ii) the intensive and 
extensive margins of exports to China and India.1 Exporting to distant emerging 
markets involves higher costs and risks than supplying nearby European custom-
ers. We expect therefore that only the best performing firms among the exporters 
manage to access faraway destinations.  
We find in fact that basic firm characteristics like size and productivity, carry 
the brunt of the explanatory power, more than country and industry features. In a 
sense, we are giving support to a kind of monotonicity argument: small and low-
productivity firms do not export, firms with average size and productivity sell 
their products to foreign and, presumably, close markets, while firms that are even 
larger and more productive can export to distant and difficult markets (see Melitz, 
2003).  
As a second step, we try to delve into the black box of firms’ characteristics.  
Productivity and size are of course second order outcomes of strategic choices like 
governance, technology, composition of factors of production etc. And also, for 
given productivity and size these other features may provide independent explana-
tory power for firms success in foreign markets. Governance is likely to play a 
very relevant role. A central factor is of course family ownership. Its influence on 
overall performance and strategic choices, like entering export markets, has been 
extensively analysed in the literature. Family ownership is generally perceived as 
a hindering factor because of risk aversion in decision making (Barba Navaretti et 
al., 2008), dynastic management (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003; Bennedsen et al., 
2007), dilution of capital and control (Ellul et al., 2010), reluctance to decentralise 
decision making and so forth. Given the pervasiveness of family control in Euro-
                                                          
1 The Efige data set does not provide information on exports to the two countries separately. 
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pean firms (86 per cent2), we regard it as a central aspect of our investigation to 
dissect its influence on firms exporting performance. Of course, the impact of 
ownership also depends on governance and management structure: managers can 
still be independent, can be non family member professionals, the decision process 
can be decentralized even with family owners, managers with expertise in interna-
tional business can be hired. We therefore try to establish whether and to what ex-
tent these features influence export decisions. 
We find that family ownership does indeed lower firms’ export propensity, but 
that the ownership effect is strictly related to how far the family relinquishes deci-
sional power to external managers.  In fact, it is the presence of family members in 
executive management that drives the negative relationship between family own-
ership and export performance. Once we control for this factor, family ownership 
per se is no longer significant. Export propensity is also lower if executives have 
no previous foreign experience and when strategic decision making is not decen-
tralised. These features are also linked in a similar way to the further step of ex-
porting to faraway emerging markets. 
 
The reminder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section presents 
the data and a set of key stylized facts. Section 3 reports the basic estimations of 
the extensive and intensive margins of European exports, both in general and to-
wards China and India. In this basic estimation we only include standard firm lev-
el characteristics like size and productivity. Section 4 looks at the impact of type 
of ownership and governance. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
Figure A1 shows that exports to China have grown for all developed countries. 
Japan and other industrialised Asian countries profited the most form the expan-
sion of the Chinese market due to their proximity. Figure A2 focuses on European 
countries included in the dataset: Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy and 
UK and Italy. The trends are quite similar, but while in 1990 the export share to 
China was comparable among European countries, in 2008 the share for EU coun-
tries (in particular France and Germany) became on average higher than the Italian 
one.  
Which are the determinants of the firms’ success in exports and are there some 
heterogeneous effects explaining export to faraway countries compared to export 
to neighboring countries?  We will try to answer these questions making use of the 
Efige dataset, a firm level database collected within the project “Efige - European 
                                                          
2 According to the “wide” definition of family ownership considered in this paper, which in-
cludes also firms where the main shareholder has more than 30% of the capital. Using the nar-
rower definition (firms that declared to have a “family ownership”) the share in our sample re-
duces to 74%. 
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Firms in a Global Economy: internal policies for external competitiveness”. Data 
concern seven European Union countries: Austria, Germany, France, Hungary, It-
aly, Spain and UK. The sample distribution by country is shown in Table A1. The 
survey questionnaire contains both qualitative and quantitative information cover-
ing different areas: the ownership and management structure of the firm, its em-
ployment composition, investment and innovation activity, its internationalization 
strategies and the financial structure. Survey data have been matched with balance 
sheet information drawn from the Amadeus database, managed by Bureau van 
Dyck, to retrieve an indicator of labour productivity.  
The survey has been carried out once in 2010. Only balance sheet data have a 
panel structure. The results reported in our analysis are therefore essentially de-
scriptive. 
For the aim of the present work we mainly exploit information concerning the 
firm international activity, ownership and management structure. Our focus is both 
on the export activity in general, regardless of the destination country, and on the 
exports to China and India.3 The survey questionnaire allows us to split destination 
markets in 8 groups: European Union (EU-15), other European Union countries, 
other European Countries (outside EU), China and India, other Asian countries, 
USA and Canada, Central and South America, other countries.4 
Figure A3 provides a bird’s eye view of the distribution of European exporters 
by destination country. The great part of them sells to close markets (EU15), while 
only a small number of firms successfully reaches faraway ones.  
This could be due both to their cultural distance (consumers’ tastes and prefer-
ences in China and India may be different from the ones in western countries and 
this may require the need to adapt products for exports) and to the fact that experi-
ence of European firms in these countries is still scarce and time is needed to reap 
the new business opportunities offered by these countries.  
The share of Italian firms exporting to China and India (17.7%) on the popula-
tion of exporters is much lower than in Germany or France (27.3 and 22.2%, re-
spectively); this is in contrast with findings on the share of exporters to extra-
European markets excluding China and India (see table A3). Here the share of 
Italian firms is indeed higher than for other European countries, as if China and 
India had  high entry costs  compared to other distant markets, USA and Canada 
and these costs were especially binding for Italian exporters. On the other hand 
German exporters are more likely to penetrate difficult markets, that are geograph-
ically and culturally distant. These differences across countries could be explained 
by their different industrial structure in terms of firms’ size, sectoral distributions, 
innovative capacity and productivity. Thus, the advantage of Germany in emerg-
ing countries could be related to its sectoral specialization or, more likely, to the 
                                                          
3 The questionnaire does not allow to distinguish exporters to China from exporters to India. In 
the text we sometimes refer to these two countries as emergent countries. 
4 The geographical destination of exports is recorded only for 2008. Thus, when we analyze the 
destination-specific experience of exporters we focus only on that year.   
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great role (weight) that medium and large firms have in German manufacturing 
(see Barba Navaretti et al, 2010).  
Table A4 shows that exporters are on average larger (measuring size in terms 
of employment) and more productive (measuring productivity by output per work-
er) than non exporters, confirming a well known result. However, significant gaps 
also exist between exporters to emerging countries and exporters to other coun-
tries. Considering only the firms in our sample that do export, we observe that 
those operating in China and India are on average (and significantly) bigger than 
other exporters. On the contrary, we do not detect any significant difference when 
comparing simple productivity measures. Quite interestingly differences are not 
confined to the firms structural or economic characteristics, also ownership and 
management practices make a significant difference. Reaching faraway markets is 
more likely when a firm belongs to a group, it is not a “family-enterprise” with a 
CEO who is a member of  the owning family and when it promotes best manage-
ment practices by rewarding managers according to performance and by adopting 
a management structure with decentralised responsibility. This is true not only 
when we compare exporters to non exporters, but also, within the group of “inter-
national” firms, when we single out those that have entered faraway markets. 
3.  The extensive and intensive margin of trade: base 
regressions 
 
In the previous section we have highlighted the main characteristics of export-
ing firms. Now we move to a more general and systematic approach and perform a 
regression analysis of the extensive and intensive margins of trade on country, 
sector and firm characteristics. In this way, we can assess the relative importance 
of the different factors and the magnitude of their impact on exports.  
The main objective of the paper is to unveil (and measure the impact of) the 
distinctive features of firms that succeed in exporting to China and India. Before 
turning to that, though, it is useful to set the stage by looking at the characteristics 
of exporters irrespectively of the destination markets.  
The most recent contributions to the international trade literature with hetero-
geneous firms provide wide support, both theoretical (Bernard, Jensen, Eaton and 
Kortum, 2003; Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) and empirical (Bernard 
and Jensen, 1995, 1999, 2004a, 2004b, ISGEP, 2008),5 to the idea that exporting 
                                                          
5 The project sought to study the relationship between exports and productivity by reducing 
methodological and statistical differences. Some 40 researchers took part, conducting analyses of 
firm-level data from 14 countries (Austria, Belgium, Chile, China, Colombia, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). Davide Castellani 
of the University of Perugia, Francesco Serti and Chiara Tomasi of the Scuola Superiore 
Sant’Anna in Pisa participated for Italy. 
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firms are more productive, larger, more profitable and innovative than average.6 
Moreover, when restricting the analysis to the exporting firms, it turns out that 
there are further important heterogeneities; in particular, in all main European 
countries, there is a large mass of small exporters and very few large firms that 
make a great part of a country’s exports (“superstars”, see Mayer and Ottaviano, 
2007; Barba Navaretti et al., 2011). 
Why are exporting firms “better” than average? Here the empirical trade litera-
ture has focused on two hypotheses: that exporting firms are ex ante “above aver-
age” (“self-selection” hypothesis) or that their higher productivity is instead the 
result of the export activity itself (“learning-by-exporting” hypothesis).  
According to the self-selection idea, it is “harder” to export than to sell on do-
mestic markets and so only the best firms are able to do it. The difficulty of ex-
porting is ascribed to the presence of fixed costs specific to export activity, such as 
transportation, distribution and marketing costs or the costs of hiring qualified per-
sonnel to manage relations with international customers. The hypothesis of fixed 
export costs, which was first put forward by Baldwin (1988 and 1989), Baldwin 
and Krugman (1989), Dixit (1989) and Krugman (1989) and underlies theoretical 
models with heterogeneous firms à la Melitz, implicitly presupposes a barrier to 
entry in foreign markets that the less productive firms are unable to overcome. 
Starting with the work of Roberts and Tybout (1997), numerous empirical studies 
have corroborated this hypothesis;7  for Italy, the presence of fixed export costs 
has been demonstrated by Castellani (2002) and by Bugamelli and Infante (2003).  
Learning-by-exporting can derive from the fact that the greater competitive 
pressure to which exporting firms are exposed drives them to achieve efficiency 
gains, or else from the possibility for exporters to learn better technologies from 
foreign competitors or ideas for the renewal and improvement of their product 
range from foreign customers (Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and 
Wagner, 1997).  
Since the mid-1990s, in part with the growing availability of firm-level data, a 
stream of works has tested these two hypotheses. Reviewing 45 studies on 33 
countries published between 1995 and 2006, Wagner (2007) concludes that ex-
porting firms are definitely more productive than average owing to a self-selection 
effect, whereas entering foreign markets does not necessarily lead to an increase in 
efficiency at firm level. These results have been confirmed by an international 
comparative research project launched by the International Study Group on Ex-
ports and Productivity (see ISGEP, 2008).   
In Table A5 we run a probit regression of an exporter dummy variable which is 
equal to 1 if a firm exported a positive amount in 2008 and 0 otherwise. This is the 
                                                          
6 In the case of Italy, these results have been confirmed by various authors (Ferragina and 
Quintieri, 2000; Sterlacchini, 2001; Basile, 2001; Castellani, 2002; Bugamelli and Infante, 2003; 
Serti and Tomasi, 2008). 
7 See Bernard and Wagner (1997) for Germany, Bernard and Jensen (2004b) for the United 
States, Campa (2004) for Spain, Poddar (2004) for India, and Girma, Greenaway and Kneller 
(2004) for the United Kingdom. 
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so-called extensive margin of exports. In a first specification (column 1) we in-
clude only country dummies. With respect to Germany (the excluded country), the 
propensity to export is higher in Austria, Italy, Hungary and UK. France and Spain 
are in line with Germany. In column 2 we add sector dummies (2 digits of the 
Nace 2 rev.1 classification): apart from small changes in the coefficients of the 
country dummies, the sectoral dummies (not reported) point to significant differ-
ences across sectors. The share of firms engaged in export activity is lowest in the 
food industry, followed by traditional, low-tech activities. Chemical and mechani-
cal firms are most likely to export.  
Things interestingly change when we start adding firms’ characteristics (col-
umns 3-7). Overall, we confirm the received view from the existing empirical lit-
erature: size, productivity, the skill level of the workforce8 and propensity to inno-
vate are positively correlated with the export status. The inclusion of firm-level 
controls in general reduces the relevance or the size of the country dummies.  
In Table A6 we show the results for the intensive margin of exports, measured 
by the log of exported turnover. In terms of firm characteristics, we find again a 
very relevant and positive impact of firm size and productivity; even after control-
ling for those two characteristics the skill composition of the workforce has a sig-
nificant, though small, positive effect on exports. The country dummies depict a 
slightly different story than in the case of the extensive margin. In column 1, 
where we control neither for sector nor for firms’ characteristics, we see that 
France, Italy, Spain and Hungary record a lower level of exports than Germany. 
The positive gap between Germany on one side and Italy on the other appears to 
be due to firm size (column 3): once we control for firm’s size, the coefficient of 
Italy’s dummy becomes positive. The gap with France and Hungary is due to firm 
productivity (column 4). In the richest specification (column 7), Italy and Hungary 
have a positive and statistically significant coefficient of the country dummy, 
while Spain has still it strongly negative.  
To sum up, firm characteristics – size, productivity, innovation, skills of the 
workforce – are the primary determinants of export performance and dominate 
country effects. Firm characteristics almost always affect the probability of engag-
ing in exporting and the export level in the same direction: larger and more pro-
ductive firms are both more likely to export and tend to export a larger amount of 
their production. 
 
We now move to the analysis of exports to China and India and run regressions 
conditional on exporting: this restriction to a sample that includes only the export-
ers allows us to identify country, sector and firm characteristics that raise the 
probability that an already exporting firm sells its products also in China and In-
dia.  
                                                          
8 In all the regressions we only report results for one measure of skills, the share of graduate 
employees. Results are not affected if we use the share of managers and white collars on total 
employment instead. 
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The results for the extensive margin are reported in Table A7. As shown in col-
umn 1, where no controls other than country dummies are included, all countries, 
except UK, are performing worse than Germany: the gap appears to be larger for 
Hungarian and Spanish firms and smaller for French ones. Unfavourable sectoral 
specialization explains part of the countries’ gap with respect to Germany: the gap 
is indeed reduced once we control for sectors (column 2). Firm’s characteristics 
are in general highly significant with the sole exception of capital intensity, that 
does not affect the probability that a firm that is already an exporter will sell its 
products also in China and India, and of labour productivity that in some regres-
sions is not significant. These results are far from obvious: even among exporters, 
that are already larger, more productive and innovative than average, size, produc-
tivity, innovation and the education level of a firm’s labour force are relevant 
competitive factors to reach distant and large markets like China and India..  
In a sense, we are giving support to a kind of monotonic relation: small and 
low-productivity firms do not export, firms with average size and productivity sell 
their products to foreign and, most often, close markets, while to reach distant and 
difficult markets firms must be even larger and more productive. 
The effects of size and skill on the probability to export to China and India are 
quantitatively comparable to those that they have on being an exporter (see Table 
A5). Labour productivity, on the other hand, has a feebler and sometimes statisti-
cally negligible effect on the likelihood of serving far away markets, once a firm is 
already selling abroad its products. This can suggest that exporting to China and 
India entails higher fixed costs that can be better faced exploiting greater econo-
mies of scale and requires additional skills and innovation activity, while the level 
of productivity per se is not relevant. Care must be exerted, though, since the col-
linearity among workers’ skills and productivity is arguably very high. 
 
The regressions on the intensive margin for China and India (Table A8) con-
firm the monotonic relation suggested by the probit models. In a parallel with the 
results of Table A6, size, productivity and the skill composition of the workforce 
record significantly positive coefficients. On the other hand, the innovation 
dummy is no longer significant. Two explanations can be offered, not necessarily 
as alternatives. The very nature of the “innovation regressor”, that is a dummy as-
suming value 1 if the firm engaged in some innovation activity makes it ill suited 
to measure the intensity of this activity so that we might well find that it influ-
ences the probability of exporting to China and India, but not the amount ex-
ported. Furthermore, among the group of exporters, the number of innovative 
firms is very large, surpassing 4 fifths of the sample, hence the actual power of the 
test of significance of the coefficient might indeed be quite low.9 Turning to coun-
                                                          
9 This might also explain why innovation significantly influences not only the probability of be-
ing an exporter but also the amount exported in the previous regressions, where the population is 
given by all firms, including non exporters. 
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try dummies, the gap of Italian firms with respect to German competitors is due to 
the unfavourable size structure, that of French firms to a lower productivity. 
4. Controlling for type of ownership and management 
practices 
 
In this section we focus on the role of ownership and management practices: do 
they influence the ability to export, once all the other firm’s characteristics have 
been taken into account as seen above? The issue is particularly important for our 
sample. As shown in table A9 in all European countries the large majority of firms 
is family-owned.  
Many papers have analysed theoretically and empirically how family owner-
ship affects performance in general (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003, Burkart, Panunzi 
and Shleifer, 2003, Perez-Gonzalez, 2006, Sraer and Thesmar, 2006, Favero et al 
2007, Bertrand and Schoar, 2006), even after controlling for size and productivity. 
Fewer have looked at the effects on export activities.  Barba Navaretti, Faini and 
Tucci (2008), controlling for management and other firm characteristics, show that 
Italian family firms export a lower share of their output to extra European markets 
than non family firms. Their paper focuses on risk aversion: as a large share of the 
assets of the family are concentrated in the business, limited opportunities for risk 
diversification constrain the undertaking of risky activities like exporting to fara-
way markets.10  
Naturally there are many examples of family firms which are very successful 
internationalized firms. These firms essentially manage to overcome the con-
straints of a restricted ownership, by hiring competent independent managers, pos-
sibly with wide international experience, by decentralizing decision making and 
by introducing advanced governance practices. Marin and Verdier (2003 and 
2006) show how export performance is related to the degree of decentralisation of 
the governance of the firm. Mion and Opromolla (2011) find that hiring managers 
with previous export experiences increases the chances the firm will export. Fi-
nally, Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) highlights how management practices vary 
across Europe and how these affect firm level performance. 
Consequently in this section we combine ownership information with charac-
teristics of management to assess their joint effect on exporting in general and 
specifically on exporting to China and India.   
The first set of regression compares exporters’ characteristics to those of the 
whole population of firms. Looking first at the extensive margin, we progressively 
add to the set of regressors used in Table A5, variables concerning family owner-
ship and management practices. Being a “family firm”, according to the wider 
concept of family ownership discussed in appendix A (“family_wide” variable), 
                                                          
10 As mentioned before, other reasons why family ownership may hinder exports  include limited 
delegation in decision making, dynastic management, aversion to a dilution of assets and control. 
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negatively affects the probability of being an exporter (see Table A10). But this is 
true only as long as we do not control for the characteristics of the management. 
When we distinguish firms according to the importance of family members in 
their management (“fam_exec” variable), family ownership is no longer signifi-
cant, while if managers are selected within the family the probability that a firm 
sells products in foreign markets is significantly lower. This is a first insight into 
understanding that family ownership per se is not a critical factor for the interna-
tional performance of firms. What really matters is how far shareholders are able 
to delegate managerial power outside the family boundaries. Of course there is a 
problem of endogeneity in this variable as well as in several others used to explain 
internationalisation patterns. Family firms may tap external managerial resources 
once they decide to enter foreign markets. Still this result tells us that whatever the 
causal links, using external managers is an important condition for successfully 
exporting. 
That delegating power is important also emerges from the variable measuring 
the degree of centralization in the decision processes: firms with a highly central-
ized management structure, where there is little handing over of decisions and en-
trustment, are less likely to compete in foreign markets. One would expect this 
variable to be highly correlated to the presence of external managers in family 
firms, which by definition implies a concentration of decision making per se. The 
fact that this variable maintains explanatory power anyhow is of further support of 
the view that managerial practices are an essential factor for running global busi-
nesses.  Delegation of power remains significant even after controlling for sector’s 
characteristics. The latter control is crucial, since one might expect that the degree 
of trust and hence the amount of delegation within a firm depends, among other 
things, on the nature of competition within a given sector: where blueprints, know-
how and strategic decision are a key factor in firms’ success, the risks linked to 
sharing sensitive information might limit the amount of optimal delegation.11 Not 
surprisingly, the presence of managers with foreign experience is also positively 
related to the probability of exporting. As for non-family mangers we cannot es-
tablish the direction of the causal link here, but still the positive sign of the corre-
lation has important analytical value anyhow.  
Finally, the sign (and size) of coefficients of the other standard firm-specific 
variables (size, productivity, innovation and skills) is not heavily affected by the 
introduction of the new regressors.  
So far the evidence confirms that ownership and management characteristics 
play a significant role in explaining a firm’s success as an exporter, even after we 
control for other important sources of firms’ heterogeneity. What can one say of 
these variables when we compare exporters to China and India with other export-
ers?  
                                                          
11 However the relationship between management centralization and export probability is a weak 
one, since the introduction of the variable measuring productivity wipes out its effect. 
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Focusing on the probability of exporting to China and India (conditional on be-
ing an exporter) Table A11 shows that while family ownership is never signifi-
cant, family managers still exert a negative effect. Belonging to a group is a con-
tributing factor to exporting in faraway markets, while it was non significant in 
general.12 The foreign experience of managers is significantly enhancing the like-
lihood of exporting to China and India, while the degree of centralization in man-
agement is not significant. The latter result might be due to the fact that being an 
exporter already requires a certain level of delegation and any further handing 
over of decisional power does not translate in higher chances of exporting to 
China and India. Or that here decentralisation of decision making and the presence 
of non-family managers are highly correlated, in fact also this latter variable loses 
significance in the last regression. So in all, these results show that variables per-
taining to the organisation of the firm matter for the further step of exporting to 
more difficult and distant markets. 
Considering now – among the group of exporters – factors affecting the amount 
of merchandise sold on foreign markets (intensive margin), we find broadly speak-
ing a confirmation of the results for the intensive margin of exports (see Table 
A12). Family ownership has a significant negative effect on the quantity of ex-
ports only as long as we do not control for management characteristics. Once we 
introduce the fam_exec variable only this has a significant (and negative) effect. 
Conversely, having a centralised governance no longer hinders sales in foreign 
markets. The quantity exported tend to be larger for firms belonging to a group 
and whenever managers of the firm have previous foreign experience. This result 
might support the hypothesis that the foreign experience of the managers posi-
tively influences the probability that a given firm exports, as it helps achieving 
larger sales and exploiting economies of scales to overcome the fixed cost of mar-
ket entry. 
Similarly, if we consider the intensive margin of exports to China and India,the 
quantity exported to faraway markets increases for firms within a group and in the 
presence of managers with foreign experience, thus confirming results found con-
sidering the intensive margin determinants for general exporters (Table A13). 
Family ownership is significant only when there is no control for family members 
in the management, in which case the usual conclusion holds. Again, centraliza-
tion of the management has no effect.  
Overall the evidence points to a very significant (and negative) role of the fam-
ily presence in the management of the firms, and not so much of family ownership 
per se, not only for exporters in general but also when we compare them with 
firms that sell their products in China and India. Other factors that – conversely – 
influence positively export performance in general and the ability to penetrate 
faraway markets in particular, are the international experience of the managers and 
being part of a group. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
The importance of firm level characteristics for the export performance is not a 
new fact. A large strand of literature has documented the role of firms’ size, pro-
ductivity, skill composition and innovation as significant determinants of their in-
ternational status. There exist additional costs of selling goods in foreign markets, 
such as transportation expenses and marketing costs, that represent an entry bar-
rier. As a consequence, only large, efficient and innovative firms are able to cope 
with these costs and survive in the more competitive international market (Roberts 
and Tybout, 1995; Melitz, 2003). Our contribution to this literature is to investi-
gate the role of the ownership and management structure of firms. 
We ask whether ownership matters for internationalization, which management 
practices help firms to go international, and if their impact may be heterogeneous 
according to the destination country the firm wants to reach, in particular for 
emerging markets. A simple descriptive analysis reveals some facts that are in line 
with previous empirical studies. Family firms or family-managed firms have been 
showed to be less dynamic, less productive and more risk-adverse than other firms 
(Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003, Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003, Perez-
Gonzalez, 2006 and Barba Navaretti, Faini and Tucci, 2008,). Our evidence points 
out that what actually matters is not family ownership per se, but the degree of in-
volvement of the family in the management of the firm. Exporters are less likely 
to be family-dominated than non-exporters, and among exporters firms selling to 
China and India are still less likely to be controlled by the family owner. The de-
centralization of decision-making and the foreign experience of managers also 
have significant positive influence on the probability of entering and on the ability 
to expand the activity in foreign markets. Exporters and, among them, exporters to 
China and India make use of decentralization strategies and their executives are 
more likely to have worked abroad. It is worth to notice that the differences be-
tween exporters to China and India and other exporters are at least as large as the 
ones between exporters and not exporters. Thus, not only exporters represent a pe-
culiar group of firms, but firms entering emergent countries represent a still more 
peculiar sub-group. 
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APPENDIX A: DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
We use the firm level EU-Efige/Bruegel-UniCredit dataset. The data have been 
collected within the project Efige - European Firms in a Global Economy: inter-
nal policies for external competitiveness - supported by the Directorate General 
Research of the European Commission through its FP7 program. GFK Eurisko 
dealt with the collection of data via CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone Inter-
view) and CAWI (Computer Assisted Web Interview). This database collects in-
formation for seven European Countries – Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, It-
aly, Spain and United Kingdom – and provides insights on the following firm 
characteristics and activities: structure of the firm; workforce; investment, techno-
logical innovation and R&D; internationalization; finance; market and pricing.  
The sampling design has followed a stratification by sector and firm size, it 
covers firms with at least 10 employees. All elaborations and regressions on data 
have been computed using weights to report the sample to the national firm uni-
verse. 
We define as a “family firm” all firms replying “yes” to the question “Is your 
firm directly or indirectly controlled by an individual or family-owned entity?” 
and firms declaring that at least 30% of their capital is held by an individual/group 
of individuals (wide-definition). 
In order to have a proxy for the exporters, we consider the replies to the follow-
ing two questions: “has the firm sold abroad some or all of its own products / ser-
vices in 2008?” and “before 2008, has the firm exported any of its products?”. A 
firm is termed “exporter” if it replies “yes, directly from the home country” to the 
first question and “regularly/always” or “sometimes” to the second. We felt that 
using only the first question to define exporters might exclude firms that only 
temporarily stopped selling abroad, given that 2008 has witnessed an extraordi-
nary contraction in international trade.  
When we consider exporters to China and India, we have to rely solely on the 
export activity in 2008, since the breakup by geographical destination of interna-
tional activity is available only for that year.13 
 
The survey data have been matched with balance sheet data from Amadeus 
(Bureau van Dyck) to construct a measure of labour productivity. 
                                                          
13 For more information about the sampling construction, the collection of data, the sample char-
acteristics and the weighting procedure see Barba et al. (2010). 
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APPENDIX B: Tables and graphs 
 
 
Table A1: Sample distribution by country 
Country Number of firms 
AUT 482 
FRA 2,973 
GER 2,973 
HUN 488 
ITA 3,021 
SPA 2,832 
UK 2,142 
Total 14,911 
Source: Authors’ elaborations from EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit dataset 
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Table A2: Variables definitions 
 
 
  VARIABLE DEFINITION 
Export Activity Exp (Wide Definition) Dummy assuming value 1 if the firm exported in 2008 or exported in previous 
years. 
Exp (Narrow Defini-
tion) 
Dummy assuming value 1 if the firm exported in 2008. 
exp_chiind Dummy assuming value 1 if the firm exported to China and/or India in 2008. 
Ownership family_wide Dummy assuming value 1 if the firm is controlled by an individual or family-
owned entity or if at least 30% of its capital is held by an individual/group of in-
dividuals. 
group Dummy assuming value 1 if the firm belongs to a group. 
Management fam_exec Share of executives related to the family/individual who owns the firm  (over the 
total number of executives). 
Management    
Practices 
forexp_exec Dummy assuming value 1 if executives of the firm have worked abroad for at 
least one year. 
centralised Dummy assuming value 1 if the decision-making is mainly a centralised process. 
reward Dummy assuming value 1 if executives are rewarded on their performance. 
Control Varia-
bles 
lsize log(employment) 
skill Share of skilled workers (managers+white collars). 
grad_emp Share of graduated employees  
inno Dummy assuming value 1 if the firm innovates (process/product/both), 
llp log(Labour Productivity) 
lkl log(capital intensity) 
If not differently specified, variables refer to the year 2008. 
 
19 
Table A3: The geographical distribution of exporters 
(percentages) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations from EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit dataset 
Share of exporters over the whole population are defined both according to the narrow 
and the wide definition of exporter (see Table A2). Share of exporters according to the nar-
row definition and destination-specific shares of exporters are defined for the export activ-
ity in 2008. Share of exporters according to the wide definition capture the firm export ac-
tivity in both 2008 and previous years. 
 Share of Exporters to Countries Outside Europe does not include firms exporting to 
China and India.  
 
Table A4: Exporters characteristics: averages by destination markets 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations from EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit dataset 
Columns diff report the significance level of a t-test on the equality of means between the 
groups Exporters/NonExporters and the groups Exporters to China and India/ Exporters to 
Other Countries. a,b,c Significant at 1%,5% and 10%, ns not-significant.
Over the Whole Population Over Exporters' Popul 
country 
Share of 
exporters. 
Wide 
definition 
Share of 
exporters. 
Narrow 
definition 
Share of 
Exporters to 
China and 
India 
Share of 
Exporters to 
markets 
Outside 
Europe excl. 
China/India 
Share of 
Exporters to 
China and 
India 
Share of 
Exporters to 
markets 
Outside 
Europe excl. 
China/India 
AUT 73.2 54.8 9.8 10.7 17.8 19.5 
FRA 58.5 45.4 10.1 18.0 22.2 39.7 
GER 60.0 41.2 11.2 11.4 27.3 27.7 
HUN 67.3 49.0 0.8 7.0 1.6 14.4 
ITA 72.2 63.5 11.2 25.9 17.7 40.9 
SPA 61.1 47.9 5.2 21.1 10.8 44.1 
UK 64.0 55.6 14.4 23.7 25.8 42.7 
Total 64.4 51.4 10.2 19.2 19.9 37.4 
 
Variable Non Exporters Exporters diff
Exporters to all 
countries 
excluding 
China/India
Exporters to 
China/India
diff
labour productivity 116.88 152.32 a 152.27 163.41 ns
size 39 83 a 73 123 a
family 0.75 0.73 a 0.73 0.67 a
family_wide 0.89 0.84 a 0.84 0.78 a
fam_exec 54.17 45.92 a 47.98 36.88 a
centralised 0.79 0.71 a 0.72 0.65 a
reward 0.28 0.39 a 0.36 0.50 a
forexp_exec 0.10 0.25 a 0.23 0.35 a
group 0.12 0.21 a 0.20 0.33 a
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Fig. A1: 
 
 
Fig. A2: 
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Fig. A3: Percentage of exporting firms by destination market 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations from EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit dataset. 
The Table shows the geographical distribution of exporters.  
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Table A5: Export extensive margin: probit regression on all firms 
 
Probit Estimations. The dependent variable is a dummy capturing the export status of firms in 2008 
and/or previous years. All estimations include two-digit NACE dummies and are run on the weighted 
sample. The drop of the number of observations across columns is due to missing data for the firm level 
variables used in the regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
See Table A2 for the definition of variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
a b c d e f g
lsize 0.335*** 0.327*** 0.333*** 0.301*** 0.284***
[0.015] [0.021] [0.021] [0.021] [0.022]
llp2 0.241*** 0.217*** 0.218*** 0.207***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.027]
grad_emp 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.009***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
inno 0.471*** 0.439***
[0.037] [0.038]
lkl 0.052***
[0.015]
AUT 0.365*** 0.460*** 0.472*** 0.501*** 0.549*** 0.480*** 0.438**
[0.082] [0.093] [0.096] [0.173] [0.172] [0.164] [0.197]
FRA -0.037 -0.019 0.017 -0.064 -0.056 -0.036 -0.079
[0.039] [0.039] [0.040] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.050]
HUN 0.195*** 0.239*** 0.255*** 0.529*** 0.436*** 0.460*** 0.363***
[0.068] [0.070] [0.071] [0.105] [0.107] [0.109] [0.112]
ITA 0.335*** 0.282*** 0.369*** 0.260*** 0.293*** 0.264*** 0.170***
[0.036] [0.037] [0.038] [0.043] [0.044] [0.044] [0.051]
SPA 0.028 0.056 0.132*** 0.095** 0.077* 0.036 -0.052
[0.036] [0.037] [0.038] [0.046] [0.046] [0.047] [0.052]
UK 0.105*** 0.060 0.085** 0.284*** 0.257*** 0.219** 0.161
[0.039] [0.040] [0.040] [0.098] [0.098] [0.099] [0.101]
Constant 0.253*** -0.167*** -1.337*** -2.358*** -2.340*** -2.526*** -2.434***
[0.025] [0.042] [0.070] [0.152] [0.150] [0.152] [0.160]
Observations 14910 14723 14723 10246 10241 10241 9702
Pseudo-R2 0.011 0.065 0.096 0.118 0.124 0.145 0.140
Wald Chi2 146.9 958.9 1363 932.1 989.7 1146 1050
Log-likelihood -9602 -8953 -8654 -5720 -5680 -5545 -5227
VARIABLES
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Table A6: Export intensive margin: OLS regression on all firms (Only Ex-
porters) 
 
OLS Estimations. The dependent variable is the log of the firm export value recorded in 2008 for export-
ers. All estimations include two-digit NACE dummies and are run on the weighted sample. The drop of 
the number of observations across columns is due to missing data for the firm level variables used in the 
regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
See Table A2 for the definition of variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
a b c d e f g
lsize 1.261*** 1.207*** 1.216*** 1.208*** 1.195***
[0.027] [0.021] [0.020] [0.020] [0.022]
llp2 0.917*** 0.887*** 0.889*** 0.850***
[0.033] [0.032] [0.032] [0.035]
grad_emp 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
inno 0.161*** 0.156***
[0.055] [0.056]
lkl 0.059***
[0.021]
AUT 0.072 0.160 0.168 0.243* 0.314** 0.293** 0.336**
[0.252] [0.222] [0.163] [0.140] [0.141] [0.141] [0.149]
FRA -0.323*** -0.373*** -0.267*** -0.018 -0.033 -0.021 -0.018
[0.092] [0.086] [0.067] [0.059] [0.058] [0.058] [0.061]
HUN -0.785*** -0.706*** -0.722*** 0.478*** 0.396*** 0.418*** 0.344***
[0.199] [0.193] [0.143] [0.122] [0.122] [0.122] [0.126]
ITA -0.162** -0.164** 0.312*** 0.249*** 0.299*** 0.293*** 0.229***
[0.075] [0.072] [0.060] [0.050] [0.050] [0.050] [0.058]
SPA -0.821*** -0.808*** -0.438*** -0.148** -0.177*** -0.183*** -0.245***
[0.088] [0.084] [0.069] [0.061] [0.060] [0.060] [0.065]
UK -0.098 -0.044 -0.047 0.050 0.000 -0.007 -0.008
[0.148] [0.134] [0.127] [0.117] [0.114] [0.114] [0.116]
Constant 7.172*** 7.065*** 2.289*** -2.252*** -2.276*** -2.375*** -2.299***
[0.062] [0.115] [0.150] [0.202] [0.195] [0.197] [0.204]
Observations 5752 5694 5694 5537 5533 5533 5316
R-squared 0.019 0.108 0.451 0.584 0.592 0.593 0.581
VARIABLES
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Table A7: Export extensive margin in China and India: probit regression, only 
exporters 
 
Probit Estimations. The dependent variable is a dummy capturing the firm export activity in China and 
India in 2008 for exporters only. All estimations include two-digit NACE dummies and are run on the 
weighted sample. The drop of the number of observations across columns is due to missing data for the 
firm level variables used in the regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 
5%, 10%. 
See Table A2 for the definition of variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
a b c d e f g
lsize 0.196*** 0.155*** 0.161*** 0.152*** 0.134***
[0.017] [0.025] [0.025] [0.025] [0.026]
llp2 0.077* 0.055 0.059 0.076**
[0.041] [0.040] [0.040] [0.037]
grad_emp 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.009***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
inno 0.252*** 0.247***
[0.057] [0.059]
lkl 0.012
[0.023]
AUT -0.320*** -0.368*** -0.384*** -0.195 -0.137 -0.173 -0.178
[0.109] [0.111] [0.111] [0.162] [0.165] [0.164] [0.177]
FRA -0.161*** -0.114* -0.095 -0.033 -0.044 -0.027 -0.037
[0.057] [0.060] [0.061] [0.069] [0.070] [0.070] [0.073]
HUN -1.542*** -1.483*** -1.520*** -1.401*** -1.475*** -1.454*** -1.446***
[0.180] [0.183] [0.190] [0.247] [0.241] [0.240] [0.241]
ITA -0.323*** -0.282*** -0.203*** -0.216*** -0.176*** -0.186*** -0.216***
[0.050] [0.052] [0.053] [0.060] [0.060] [0.061] [0.068]
SPA -0.636*** -0.562*** -0.510*** -0.494*** -0.520*** -0.531*** -0.544***
[0.059] [0.062] [0.063] [0.075] [0.075] [0.076] [0.081]
UK -0.045 -0.021 0.018 0.191* 0.165 0.149 0.095
[0.054] [0.056] [0.057] [0.110] [0.109] [0.108] [0.111]
Constant -0.604*** -0.956*** -1.721*** -1.960*** -1.981*** -2.165*** -2.228***
[0.038] [0.082] [0.113] [0.245] [0.240] [0.240] [0.233]
Observations 7920 7821 7821 5555 5551 5551 5329
Pseudo-R2 0.028 0.079 0.095 0.102 0.111 0.115 0.115
Wald Chi2 205.6 502.5 612.9 374.1 407.9 427.5 406.6
Log-likelihood -3843 -3595 -3532 -2574 -2550 -2536 -2419
VARIABLES
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Table A8: Export intensive margin in China and India: OLS regression,  
only exporters to China and India 
 
OLS Estimations. The dependent variable is the log of the firm export value to China and India recorded 
in 2008 for exporters in those countries. All estimations include two-digit NACE dummies and are run on 
the weighted sample. The drop of the number of observations across columns is due to missing data for 
the firm level variables used in the regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * significant at 
1%, 5%, 10%. 
See Table A2 for the definition of variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
a b c d e f g
lsize 0.980*** 0.953*** 0.978*** 0.980*** 0.970***
[0.055] [0.041] [0.038] [0.039] [0.040]
llp2 0.887*** 0.834*** 0.832*** 0.786***
[0.083] [0.077] [0.077] [0.089]
grad_emp 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
inno -0.072 -0.080
[0.125] [0.129]
lkl 0.067
[0.048]
AUT 0.763* 0.716* 0.664* 0.550* 0.696** 0.713** 0.931***
[0.449] [0.424] [0.363] [0.308] [0.309] [0.310] [0.326]
FRA -0.534*** -0.561*** -0.352** -0.180 -0.201 -0.203 -0.123
[0.180] [0.170] [0.141] [0.136] [0.134] [0.133] [0.139]
HUN -0.394 -0.523 -0.416 0.781*** 0.385 0.393 0.434*
[0.600] [0.706] [0.395] [0.197] [0.251] [0.254] [0.240]
ITA -0.286** -0.314** 0.173 0.088 0.195 0.197 0.221*
[0.139] [0.146] [0.129] [0.124] [0.120] [0.120] [0.131]
SPA -0.726*** -0.682*** -0.465*** -0.284* -0.359** -0.356** -0.330*
[0.207] [0.211] [0.175] [0.172] [0.171] [0.170] [0.177]
UK -0.501* -0.445* 0.008 0.268 0.126 0.136 0.193
[0.256] [0.242] [0.233] [0.192] [0.182] [0.184] [0.193]
Constant 5.929*** 5.248*** 1.269*** -3.320*** -3.402*** -3.337*** -3.344***
[0.100] [0.308] [0.317] [0.514] [0.492] [0.511] [0.533]
Observations 1190 1176 1176 1151 1151 1151 1094
R-squared 0.022 0.084 0.363 0.485 0.508 0.508 0.487
VARIABLES
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Table A9: Share of family firms by country 
 
Source: Authors’ elaborations from EU-EFIGE/Bruegel-UniCredit dataset. 
 
country Narrow Wide Wide - Narrow
AUT 82.39 87.69 5.30
FRA 57.58 81.03 23.44
GER 83.87 90.88 7.01
HUN 55.67 81.79 26.12
ITA 75.60 86.81 11.21
SPA 76.45 83.54 7.09
UK 64.52 82.55 18.03
Total 73.73 85.98 12.25
Family firms by country: "narrow" and "wide" definition 1
(1) "narrow": family firms i.e. firms that declared to have a family ownership; "wide": includes family 
firms and firms having an individual as the main shareholder (capital share>=30%)
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Table A10: Export extensive margin: probit regression on all firms with  
“family” variables 
 
Probit Estimations. The dependent variable is a dummy capturing the export status of firms in 2008 
and/or previous years. All estimations include two-digit NACE dummies and are run on the weighted 
sample. The drop of the number of observations across columns is due to missing data for the firm level 
variables used in the regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
See Table A2 for the definition of variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES a b c d
llp2 0.214*** 0.211*** 0.209*** 0.207***
[0.025] [0.025] [0.026] [0.027]
lsize 0.295*** 0.284*** 0.279*** 0.257***
[0.021] [0.022] [0.023] [0.023]
grad_emp 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
inno 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.443***
[0.036] [0.036] [0.038] [0.039]
family_wide -0.068 -0.034 0.030 0.055
[0.054] [0.054] [0.065] [0.066]
fam_exec -0.001** -0.001***
[0.001] [0.001]
group 0.104* 0.090 0.027
[0.056] [0.060] [0.061]
centralised -0.068
[0.048]
forexp_exec 0.331***
[0.053]
AUT 0.479*** 0.470*** 0.510*** 0.507***
[0.164] [0.164] [0.173] [0.182]
FRA -0.045 -0.062 -0.065 -0.003
[0.047] [0.048] [0.049] [0.051]
HUN 0.448*** 0.442*** 0.442*** 0.402***
[0.109] [0.109] [0.116] [0.120]
ITA 0.258*** 0.254*** 0.297*** 0.365***
[0.044] [0.044] [0.048] [0.050]
SPA 0.027 0.022 0.072 0.093*
[0.047] [0.047] [0.052] [0.053]
UK 0.195* 0.166 0.078 0.068
[0.100] [0.103] [0.111] [0.117]
Constant -2.425*** -2.406*** -2.384*** -2.325***
[0.165] [0.166] [0.181] [0.187]
Observations 10231 10231 9196 8823
Pseudo-R2 0.145 0.146 0.148 0.153
Wald Chi2 1148 1146 1070 1075
Log-likelihood -5538 -5535 -4973 -4767
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Table A11: Export extensive margin in China and India: probit regression, 
only exporters with “family” variables 
 
Probit Estimations. The dependent variable is a dummy capturing the firm export activity in China and 
India in 2008 for exporters only. All estimations include two-digit NACE dummies and are run on the 
weighted sample. The drop of the number of observations across columns is due to missing data for the 
firm level variables used in the regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 
5%, 10%. 
See Table A2 for the definition of variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a b c d
llp2 0.055 0.045 0.056 0.054
[0.040] [0.040] [0.043] [0.044]
lsize 0.143*** 0.124*** 0.132*** 0.113***
[0.025] [0.027] [0.028] [0.030]
grad_emp 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.006***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
inno 0.259*** 0.260*** 0.232*** 0.206***
[0.057] [0.057] [0.061] [0.062]
family_wide -0.119* -0.059 0.048 0.018
[0.070] [0.075] [0.088] [0.090]
fam_exec -0.002** -0.001
[0.001] [0.001]
group 0.167** 0.158* 0.180**
[0.077] [0.083] [0.084]
centralised -0.035
[0.065]
forexp_exec 0.126*
[0.068]
AUT -0.181 -0.201 -0.271 -0.300
[0.164] [0.164] [0.175] [0.194]
FRA -0.046 -0.081 -0.088 -0.081
[0.071] [0.074] [0.075] [0.079]
HUN -1.485*** -1.497*** -1.392*** -1.315***
[0.239] [0.244] [0.246] [0.252]
ITA -0.195*** -0.202*** -0.158** -0.140**
[0.061] [0.061] [0.065] [0.068]
SPA -0.546*** -0.559*** -0.593*** -0.611***
[0.076] [0.076] [0.087] [0.089]
UK 0.111 0.053 0.009 0.018
[0.110] [0.110] [0.122] [0.131]
Constant -2.004*** -1.955*** -2.076*** -1.937***
[0.258] [0.260] [0.274] [0.280]
Observations 5544 5544 4961 4741
Pseudo-R2 0.116 0.118 0.117 0.112
Wald Chi2 434.5 446.4 398.5 377.2
Log-likelihood -2529 -2525 -2248 -2158
VARIABLES
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Table A12: Export intensive margin: OLS regression on exporters with  
“family” variables 
 
OLS Estimations. The dependent variable is the log of the firm export value recorded in 2008 for export-
ers. All estimations include two-digit NACE dummies and are run on the weighted sample. The drop of 
the number of observations across columns is due to missing data for the firm level variables used in the 
regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, 10%. 
See Table A2 for the definition of variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES a b c d
llp2 0.881*** 0.864*** 0.847*** 0.850***
[0.032] [0.032] [0.033] [0.034]
lsize 1.190*** 1.156*** 1.145*** 1.106***
[0.021] [0.023] [0.024] [0.026]
grad_emp 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.010***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
inno 0.165*** 0.165*** 0.162*** 0.118**
[0.055] [0.054] [0.056] [0.056]
family_wide -0.210*** -0.102 -0.067 -0.055
[0.067] [0.067] [0.080] [0.077]
fam_exec -0.002*** -0.002**
[0.001] [0.001]
group 0.308*** 0.317*** 0.311***
[0.069] [0.071] [0.069]
centralised -0.042
[0.053]
forexp_exec 0.363***
[0.060]
AUT 0.285** 0.253* 0.265* 0.263*
[0.141] [0.139] [0.145] [0.159]
FRA -0.049 -0.112* -0.147** -0.077
[0.059] [0.061] [0.062] [0.063]
HUN 0.390*** 0.363*** 0.338*** 0.491***
[0.123] [0.122] [0.131] [0.141]
ITA 0.280*** 0.268*** 0.317*** 0.390***
[0.050] [0.050] [0.055] [0.055]
SPA -0.207*** -0.224*** -0.243*** -0.227***
[0.061] [0.060] [0.068] [0.068]
UK -0.065 -0.164 -0.271** -0.232*
[0.116] [0.119] [0.132] [0.138]
Constant -2.085*** -1.992*** -1.844*** -1.798***
[0.220] [0.219] [0.229] [0.240]
Observations 5526 5526 4946 4729
R-squared 0.594 0.598 0.598 0.601
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Table A13: Export intensive margin in China and India: OLS regression,  
only exporters with “family” variables 
 
OLS Estimations. The dependent variable is the log of the firm export value to China and India recorded 
in 2008 for exporters in those countries. All estimations include two-digit NACE dummies and are run on 
the weighted sample. The drop of the number of observations across columns is due to missing data for 
the firm level variables used in the regressions. Robust standard errors in brackets. ***, **, * significant at 
1%, 5%, 10%. 
See Table A2 for the definition of variables. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
a b c d
llp2 0.826*** 0.821*** 0.826*** 0.772***
[0.077] [0.075] [0.080] [0.078]
lsize 0.960*** 0.937*** 0.929*** 0.928***
[0.041] [0.044] [0.045] [0.046]
grad_emp 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.014***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
inno -0.060 -0.055 -0.027 -0.094
[0.125] [0.126] [0.133] [0.137]
family_wide -0.225* -0.153 -0.252 -0.232
[0.132] [0.137] [0.159] [0.162]
fam_exec 0.001 0.001
[0.002] [0.002]
group 0.197 0.170 0.163
[0.135] [0.144] [0.140]
centralised 0.131
[0.117]
forexp_exec 0.296***
[0.113]
AUT 0.690** 0.650** 0.678** 0.797**
[0.302] [0.299] [0.320] [0.402]
FRA -0.251* -0.289** -0.313** -0.243*
[0.135] [0.138] [0.139] [0.143]
HUN 0.281 0.332 0.273 0.164
[0.231] [0.243] [0.252] [0.233]
ITA 0.176 0.164 0.159 0.232*
[0.120] [0.120] [0.128] [0.131]
SPA -0.405** -0.421** -0.483** -0.419**
[0.171] [0.170] [0.198] [0.198]
UK 0.052 -0.018 0.045 0.021
[0.197] [0.200] [0.228] [0.239]
Constant -3.060*** -3.046*** -2.788*** -2.625***
[0.538] [0.536] [0.562] [0.577]
Observations 1148 1148 1031 983
R-squared 0.513 0.514 0.518 0.523
VARIABLES
